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This study is about structural change in the energy system. In a ﬁrst
step an econometric model is presented and in a second step diffusion of
GTs is embedded theoretically. By focusing on different green technol-
ogy industries (GT sector) in Germany, we analyze how policy induced
demand stimulates innovation. Taking the size of the market as a proxy
for demand and patent counts as a proxy for innovation, we ﬁnd support
that the presence of institutions enabling diffusion of GTs are correlated
with innovative activity. Public R&D expenditures also play a signiﬁ-
cant role. We additionally control for a structural break by comparing the
two institutional settings incorporated into the legal system in Germany,
namely the Stromeinspeisegesetz (SEG) and the Erneuerbare Energien-
gesetz (EEG). We cannot ﬁnd support for the supposition that innovative
activity signiﬁcantly differs for diffusion under the SEG and EEG. The
empirical ﬁndings also show that electricity prices are not the driving
force for innovative activity within the GT sector. The discussion at the
end of the paper comes to the result that diffusion of GTs – under the EEG
– is difﬁcult to be justiﬁed theoretically.
I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Andreas Freytag, Frenken Koen, Guido
Buenstorf, Jan Nill and Marco Guerzoni. I thank Christina Klose, Sarah Al Doyaili, Lutz Märker
and Nils Laub for research assistance.
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Structural change of the energy system is part of the political agenda. The
German “Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nu-
clear Safety” (BMU) treats renewable energy technologies as kind of “key tech-
nologies” for future energy supply. In Germany the share of renewable ener-
gies on total energy production has increased steadily during the last twenty
years. From 1998 until 2008, the share of renewable energies on total electric-
ity production increased from 4.8 percent to 15.1 percent. In 2008 the share
of GTs on total energy production was 9.5 percent. The distinction between
GTs shows that there are differences among the renewables available. Electric-
ity produced with water (in 2008) had a share of 23.0 percent of all electricity
produced with GTs, the share of wind was 43.5 percent, solar had a share of
4.3 percent and biomass accounted for about 22.1 percent (BMU 2008, p. 15).
Even though there has been a remarkable growth in the GT sector during
the last ten years, GTs in Germany cannot be treated as adequate substitutes
for conventional energy technologies up to now. Most GTs are still operat-
ing within a “niche”. The following example shall make this point clearer.
After the decision about the nuclear phase-out (in the year 2000) electricity
producing companies are still heavily dependent on other non-renewable en-
ergy sources like COAL or GAS (IEA 2007, p. 120). This is not surprising as
transition from non-renewable energy technologies to a system mainly based
on renewable energy technologies needs time. So far there is still uncertainty
about the point in time for this achievement. Innovations play a highly rele-
vant role for the possibility of transition, its speed and the related costs.
Diffusion of GTs, upon a certain level, depends crucially on the institu-
tional setting. The relatively high production costs for energy produced with
GTs as well as monopolistic market structures made it difﬁcult for GTs to dif-
fuse without governmental support. For the ﬁrst time market entrance became
possible under the SEG (implemented in January 1991). Investment into GTs
became economically highly attractive under the EEG (implemented in April
2000).1 Demand is artiﬁcial due to the fact that there exist technologies able to
1For the different feed-in tariffs under the EEG compare table 12, page 40.
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tional setting has been designed in a way that electricity produced with GTs
can be sold on the market (under the EEG for a guaranteed remuneration).
The managed transition in the energy sector allows to test a theory that
has become known in the literature as the so called “Schmookler hypothesis”
(Schmookler 1962, 1963): Higher demand (here proxied with the change of in-
stalled capacity in GTs) has a positive impact on ﬁrms being engaged in inno-
vative activities (here proxied with patent counts). The econometric analysis
of this paper contributes to the recent literature by looking at four important
questions. First, we try to answer the question whether the policy induced de-
mand for GTs was accompanied by innovative activity. This seems to be trivial
but there is no reason to take this relationship for granted as diffusion of GTs
does not follow natural selection processes of the markets as demand has been
created artiﬁcially. The next question we try to answer is the impact of public
R&D expenditures on innovations. Our third question is related to the impact
of electricity prices on innovative activity in the different GT industries. We
also take the institutional change under the SEG and the EEG into account and
test for a structural break.
In order to embed the econometric model, we proceed by discussing efﬁ-
ciency on the ground of a policy-induced diffusion of GTs. The focus is on two
major problems: externalities and non-sustainability. We come to the result that
the externality problem has to be taken into consideration whereas the prob-
lem of non-sustainability in the energy sector is a less striking argument for
justiﬁcation of institutions that push demand for GTs artiﬁcially. However, be-
cause of the fact that the externality problem is still one characteristic related to
conventional energy-technologies, monetary transfers directed to GTs (up to a
certain level) are needed in order to moderate the distortions in competition.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we analyze studies about
therelationshipbetweendemandandinnovationaswellastechnologicallock-
in. We further review institutional change in the German energy sector by
studying differences between the SEG and EEG. We use the results as back-
ground to formulate the hypothesis for our econometric model. Description
of the data, variables, econometric model and estimation results follow in sec-
3
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energy system in Germany. Economic theory is applied in order to ﬁnd argu-
ments in favor for investment into GTs. In section 5 we draw a conclusion.
2 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis
Innovations and the role of demand
One reason for studying innovations is related to the importance they have
on endogenous growth and economic development (Schumpeter 1934). Firms
(and entrepreneurs) may seek proﬁt and get motivated to innovate or imitate
with theaim tocontinuously increaseproﬁts. Economic actors therefore search
for better techniques and the selection of successful innovations takes place
through the market. The dynamics behind this process are best described with
the notion of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942).
From an economic perspective it is in the core of interest to detect the driv-
ing forces behind innovations. For many years there was an ongoing debate
on the question whether demand drives innovation or if it is the other way
around. The importance of demand on innovation is closely connected to the
research done by Schmookler and Griliches. However, the argument as such
can be traced back to Hicks. He made the observation that “a change in the rel-
ative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to innovations and to inven-
tions of a particular kind – directed at economizing the use of a factor which
has become relatively expensive” (Hicks 1932, pp. 124). The relationship be-
tween demand, the timing and the location of an invention, was studied by
Griliches (1957). Schmookler focused on the causality between demand and
innovation. He stated that “new goods and new techniques are unlikely to ap-
pear, and to enter the life of society without pre-existing – albeit possibly only
latent – demand” (Schmookler 1962, p. 1).
According to this reasoning, demand is the main driver to stimulate in-
ventive activities. Schmookler used patent statistics to study four different in-
dustries (railroads, agricultural equipment, paper and petroleum). He found a
linear relationship between demand and investment into capital goods in the
particular sectors. His line of argument can be summarized as follows: Mar-
4
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technique or product quality bear the chance to achieve a higher mark-up per
unit. The more units are sold on the market, the higher the proﬁts that can
be earned. There are more incentives for economic activities, measured as an
invention, the bigger the size of the market.2
The theoretical argument put forward by Schmookler has been debated for
a long time.3 Early critique on a purely demand side approach comes from
Salter (1960). Further critique builds on research done by Rosenberg (1974),
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979).4 Scherer (1982), re-run Schmookler’s analy-
sis and found much weaker evidence for the underlying demand hypothesis.
The result can be explained by the fact that Scherer used a broader dataset
and included several types of industries. Firms with market power are able to
use their strategic advantage to increase market shares. In contestable mar-
kets market power can encourage ﬁrms to innovate and to create demand
endogenously. This makes the simple demand story more complicated. The
signiﬁcance of the results is further depending on technological opportunities
of the underlying industries. Kleinknecht and Verspagen (1990) have shown
that Schmookler’s dataset contains reverse causality problems. There is the
important implicit result that even though it is true that at a given point in
time t the size of the market S has an impact on the probability to innovate
P (Pt : St ! Pt(St)), there is the endogenous effect that innovation is able to
increase the size of the market by itself (St : Pt ! St(Pt)). Demand and supply
both have to be relevant (Pavitt 1984).
However, beside the fact that the underlying relationship is more difﬁ-
cult than initially intended, the intuition of Schmooklers reasoning, that de-
mand positively effects innovations, is not falsiﬁed (Fontana and Guerzoni
2008, p. 930). There are further empirical studies on the sectoral level that sup-
port Schmookler’s argument. For instance Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2003)
2For a simple formal description compare Fontana and Guerzoni (2008).
3For a survey about the discussion on demand-pull and supply-push see Freeman (1994)
among others.
4Rosenberg (1974), p. 105, states that: “[..] technical problems and their relative complexity
stand independently of demand considerations as an explanation of the timing and direction of
inventive activity. Therefore any analytical or empirical study which does not explicitly focus
upon both demand and supply side variables is seriously deﬁcient”.
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the disease predominantly occurs in countries with relatively low average in-
comes per capita (so called neglected diseases). A similar study about innova-
tion incentives in pharmaceuticals comes from Glennerster et al. (2006). Popp
(2002) is able to show that energy prices have an impact on innovations in
energy saving technologies. Further studies are based on the demand side
approach but are more sophisticated in their research question as they dis-
tinguish between product and process innovations and do also cope with the
dynamics of the economic system (Cohen and Klepper 1992, 1996a,b, Klepper
1996, Klepper and Thompson 2006).5
The lesson that can be drawn from the previous discussion is that there is
a problem of generalization. The underlying relationship only lasts under the
special circumstances that (i) market shares and/or total market expenditures
are unaffected by innovations and (ii) ﬁxed costs of innovations have to be
spread uniformly among innovating ﬁrms. The previous arguments build the
background to formulate the ﬁrst hypothesis which is the so called Schmook-
ler hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Increase in market size (S) positively affects ﬁrms within a
GT industry j to be engaged in innovative activities.
Technological lock-in and the energy system?
As stated at the beginning of this section in markets characterized through
self-selection and creative destruction, a direct link between innovations and
growth can be drawn (Schumpeter 1934, 1942). However, self-selection pro-
cesses of markets can be accompanied by suboptimal results (market failure).
Especiallyinmarketscharacterizedthroughlearningcurvesand/oreconomies
of scale6 there is the possibility that the economic system locks-in into a tech-
nologythatcanbeconsideredtobesuboptimalexante. Thisproblemwashigh-
5It is one of the shortcomings of our study that we are not able to distinguish process from
product innovations. However, as we are convinced that both types of innovations are impor-
tant, we think that our study is still interesting.
6Adaptiveexpectationsandnetworkexternalitiesareadditionalreasonsabletocreateatech-
nological lock-in (Arthur 1994).
6
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1994).7 Technological lock-in is often used as an argument for state interven-
tion. However, there are situations in which, even though there is a temporary
lock-in to a suboptimal technology, lock-out can evolve spontaneously (Witt
1989, 1997).
Arthur (1989) distinguishes in his ﬁrst example between two technologies
(A and B) competing on the market for adoption. The early market entrance of
a certain technology (A) can make it difﬁcult or even impossible for a compet-
ing technology (B) to “get started”, as there is technological lock-in (Arthur
1989, p. 119).8 We propose to treat A as a vector with conventional non-
renewableenergytechnologies(e.g. NUCLEARpowerplantsorCOALpower
plants regime) and B as a vector of GTs (e. g. SOLAR, WIND, WATER, GEO
and BIO).9
The energy system differs from the lock-in described above with respect
to its market structure. As the energy sector is highly regulated, development
of A and B strongly depend on political decisions. A and B can be treated
to be policy induced technological systems that were not exposed to the self-
selection process of the market (compare Unruh (2000), p. 826). Following the
logic of technological lock-in, it seems plausible that if A is the dominant tech-
nological regime, B is very limited with respect to innovations and diffusion
(Unruh 2000).10
One could argue that in case of the energy system, future changes in factor
prices may allow B to evolve spontaneously at a certain point in time t the
invention pays off (compare also Popp (2002)). If technological lock-out would
7Well known is the example of QWERTY. QWERTY is the current standard used in type-
writing. Because a superior system has been developed able to substitute QWERTY from a
pure technical perspective, the lock-in to the QWERTY system has to be explained by high
switching costs and cannot be considered as optimal from an ex-post perspective.
8Examples for the suboptimal selection process of markets are given by the US television
system, the example about the U.S. programming language FORTAN or the example of QW-
ERTY (Arthur 1984, David 1985, Hartwick 1985).
9This distinction would be misleading for the case that those technologies incorporated in B
are not able to substitute conventional energy in the long run. In this case A and B cannot be
treated as substitutes ex post. This would make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd rational arguments in favor
of the support for GTs.
10Note, this does not mean that inventions do not take place. For instance the invention for
electricity production with solar as technology goes back to an invention by Becquerel in 1839
(Sørensen 1991, p. 9), nevertheless due to the high production costs commercialization of solar
cells was not able before 1954.
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into B would be directly connected to economic growth and development as
the process of creative destruction would be at force.
In contrast to this, if there is a managed transition from A to B, there is still
the problem that governments can make wrong decisions about the transfer
of resources channeled to different GTs j. Successful transition management
is highly sensitive to the institutional setting and its capability to allow for
dynamic adjustments. Further problems can occur if B is implemented on
a non-optimal point in time t (Nordhaus et al. 1973). Additional problems
occur if there is discrimination with respect to monetary resources channeled
to the different technologies incorporated in B. The result will be distortion in
competition within B.
However, in case of high uncertainty or risky externalities related to A,
investment into B is important in order to reduce distortions in competition.
Further, there is the positive impact that the knowledge stock related to GTs
increases. The creation of a niche for different GT industries j (implementa-
tion of diversity) can be seen to be a starting point in order to allow transition
towards B in the long run (Rotmans et al. 2001). Technological lock-in to a
non-sustainable energy system is a further argument for certain investments
going into GTs (Rennings 2000, Unruh 2002, Nill and Kemp 2009).11
In case of lock-in to non-renewable energy technologies, the development
of electricity prices should only play a minor role for innovation in GTs. Be-
cause there is no real consensus about the theoretical argument of lock-in (Witt
1989,1997)analternativeinterpretationhastobementioned. Thepossiblecase
thatthereisnoreactiononchangesinelectricitypricesmaysimplyindicatethe
superiority of conventional energy technologies. The interpretation, however,
is non-trivial as it is highly sensitive to the institutional setting and there is the
problem of externalities related to A. Hypothesis 2 is formulated to test the
impact electricity prices have on innovative activity.
Hypothesis 2: Increasing electricity prices have no impact on innovative ac-
11The theoretical aseesment in section 4 resumes the argument of non-sustainability of the
energy system.
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In contrast to hypothesis 2, one could also ague that due to the creation of
a niche for GTs under the SEG and EEG, electricity prices could have an im-
pact as some partial lock-out from A already took place.12 A short overview
on institutional change in the German energy sector is presented at the end of
this section.
Eco-innovations and the double externality problem
Because this study is dealing with innovations in GTs (so called “eco-inno-
vations”13) we have to take into account the “double externality problem”
(Rennings 2000). Like other innovations eco-innovations are able to create pos-
itive externalities (Arrow 1962) and additionally their diffusion is connected to
environmental speciﬁc positive externalities (Rennings 2000, p. 325).
This double externality problem (problems related to cost-internalization)
reduces incentives for ﬁrms to invest into environmental friendly R&D. Sub-
optimal market allocations can occur, as under certain conditions “technology
push and market pull alone [...] [are not] strong enough [for self-enforcement
of eco-innovations]” (Rennings 2000, p. 326). Public R&D expenditures may
help to push for eco-innovations. In order to test the technology push factor
we formulate our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Public R&D plays a signiﬁcant role for innovations within GTs.
Transition policy in the GT sector (from the SEG to the EEG)
Pull factors for GTs have been implemented through the SEG and EEG. The
switch in the energy regime from conventional energy production A to an
energy regime that mainly builds on energy produced with green technolo-
12An increase in electricity prices for GT producers can indicate a higher market potential
for GTs. However, regulation in the energy sector towards an increase of GTs may also drive
electricity prices affecting the electricity price endogenously.
13“Eco-innovationsareallmeasuresofrelevantactors(ﬁrms, politicians, unions, associations,
churches, private households) which; (i) develop new ideas, behavior, products and processes,
apply or introduce them and (ii) which contribute to a reduction of environmental burdens or
to ecologically speciﬁed sustainability targets.”(Rennings 2000, p. 322)
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different institutional stages that roughly describe institutional change in the
German energy system.
The ﬁrst stage is characterized by a monopolistic electricity market with
almost no competition. A is considered to be the main source of electricity
supply. Due to the cost argument as well as the problem that no institutional
setting exists to feed-in electricity produced with B into the network of elec-
tricity, diffusion of B is very limited.14 The ﬁrst stage shall characterize the
German energy market until 1991 (Toke and Lauber 2007, p. 683).
First change in the energy system was implemented with the “Stromein-
speisegesetz” (SEG). The SEG entered into law in January 1991 (Toke and
Lauber 2007, p. 683). The SEG was important because it allowed small and
medium electricity producing companies to feed-in their electricity into the
grid. The remuneration was based on 75 percent (for WATER and BIO), and
90 percent (for SOLAR and WIND) on the average market price for electric-
ity. The SEG allowed for some ﬁrst competition in the energy market and ﬁrst
decentralization. Nevertheless, diffusion of B was limited because remunera-
tion was lower than the average market price for electricity produced with A
(compare (SEG 1990)). The institutional arrangement under the SEG held from
1991-1999. The SEG can be seen as a necessary requirement for the contesta-
bility of conventional energy markets.
At the end of the 1990’s it came to liberalization of the energy market and
additionally the so-called “Erneuerbare Energieengesetz” (EEG) entered into
law in April 2000. It has elements best described as “command and control”,
because only some selected technologies get a deﬁned remuneration for the
electricity feeded-in. The EEG is designed in a way that discrimination be-
tween different technologies takes place through different remuneration rates.
Degression rates for the feed-in tariffs also differ. Discrimination was a neces-
sary condition in order to implement diversity. Under the EEG, until 2003, the
range of remuneration was from 6.5ct/KWh for electricity produced by the use
of WATER and BIOGAS and went up to 51.62ct/KWh for SOLAR. The highest
14Note that in some geographical areas WATER (which is considered to belong to B) is very
cost-efﬁcient and therefore was traditionally one main source of electricity supply.
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The German government so far modiﬁed the EEG two times (for details on the
differences compare EEG (2000, 2004, 2009)).
Theinstitutionalarrangementsdescribedaboveimplementedapolicy-induced
demand for GTs (compare also ﬁgure 1). The following hypothesis is deﬁned
totestwhetherastructuralbreakcanbeobservedbycomparingtheSEG(1990-
1999) with the EEG (from 2000 on).
Hypothesis4: DemanddriveninnovationundertheEEGissigniﬁcantlyhigher
compared to the SEG.
Figure 1 connects the institutional change with diffusion of GTs. The ex-
pected structural break between the SEG and the EEG is characterized through
different slope parameters related to the dotted arrows representing diffusion
of GTs under the SEG and diffusion of GTs under the EEG. Figure 2, tries to
taketheunderlyingdynamicsoftechnologicaldiffusionovertimeintoaccount
(Rotmans et al. 2001, p. 17). The inverted s-shaped curve represents three sys-
tem dimensions of diffusion. They are characterized by (a) speed of change,
(b) size of change and (c) time period of change (Rotmans et al. 2001, p. 4). For
the speed of diffusion three phases can be distinguished: (1) take-off phase, (2)
acceleration phase and (3) stabilization phase. It can be seen that changes in
slopes within phase (1) and (3) are rather low. It might be that the expected
structural break will not be signiﬁcant if diffusion is still within its take-off
phase.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We constructed a panel going from 1990 until 2005. The sectors of interest
are wind (WIND), solar (SOLAR), water & ocean (WATER), geothermal (GEO)
15For more details about the remuneration until 2003 compare table 12 (page 40). One also
has to mention that current reforms of the EEG were accompanied by changes in remuneration
rates.
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Own presentation, oriented on Rotmans et al. (2001), p. 17.
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and 5 sector speciﬁc observations.
Innovations will be measured by patent counts PAT, APAT.17 The vari-
able PAT describes the sector speciﬁc patent counts and APAT are all patents
applied in Germany in all IPC classes (the database for PAT is DEPATIS net).
We use the application date for all patents that have been granted (inventions)
within the IPC classes reported in table 11 (page 39). The data contains only
those patent counts with priority in Germany (double counting excluded). We
also have information about sector speciﬁc public expenditures on research
and development RuD and the installed capacity of the different technologies
(measured in MW/h) INCAP. Prices are measured by CPIE (consumer price
index for electricity). Electricity consumption is measured by the consump-
tion of KW/h per capita ELC. The variables PAT, RuD and INCAP contain
sector speciﬁc information. The variables CPIE and ELC are aggregated ob-
servations with country speciﬁc information. The variables are summarized
by table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Data
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Measure
PAT 80 76.5125 85.67025 3 297 Counts
APAT 80 50281.13 7286.154 37252 59685 Counts
RuD 80 17.47135 22.97052 0 91.178 Mio. Euro
INCAP 80 2213.532 3695.865 0.01 18428 MWh
CPIE 80 109.3919 15.03489 85.18 134.04 2004 indexed to 100
ELC 80 6601.992 257.3511 6246.21 7111.05 KWh per capita
Patent counts (PAT) as a proxy for innovations
Figure 3 shows a time trend of granted patents (patents counts at application
date). It isinteresting tosee thatgranted patentsfor SOLARstarted todecrease
under the EEG before they increased again after 2002. For WIND, a decline of
the patenting intensity can also be observed after 2001. Parts of the decline
16The ﬁve sources of the data are the German Patent Ofﬁce (GPO), the International Energy
Agency (IEA), Eurostat (ES), The German Statistical Ofﬁce (GSO) and the German Ministry of
the Environment (BMU). For a detailed description of the data compare page 37.
17There is the critique that “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented,
and the inventions that are patented differ greatly in ‘quality’, in the magnitude of inventive
output associated with them” (Griliches 1990a, p. 1669). However, using patents as a proxy
for innovation is very common and seems appropriate as there are only a few economically
signiﬁcant inventions which have not been patented (Dernis et al. 2000, 2004).
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could be explained with a time lag between the application date and the date
of patent granting. In order to avoid this problem, we restricted our panel to
the year 2005 even though our database on patent counts goes until 2007. We
make the implicit assumption that applied patents will be granted within a
time frame of two/three years. If one takes into account that patenting activ-
ity can also be interpreted as a stock of knowledge, even though the patent
counts decrease, the stock of knowledge does still increase. It is also notable
that SOLAR has the highest patenting activity, followed by WIND. In contrast
to this, GEO and BIO generate relatively low knowledge stocks.
Public R&D expenditures (RuD)
Figure 4 reports the industry speciﬁc R&D fundings imposed by the federal
government. It can be seen that there was a decrease in public R&D funding
for SOLAR after 1993. Compared to this, there is a relatively low level of re-
ported public R&D expenditures for technologies like WIND, WATER, BIO or
GEO. It can be seen that most R&D expenditures went into SOLAR, followed
by WIND. BIO and GEO received relatively low public R&D transfers. There
is no reported R&D support going into WATER.18
18It might be that RuD does not display all direct payments going to GTs. One ﬁrst hint
is that expenditures of the local government are not measured by RuD. Nevertheless, RuD
incorporates all R&D expenditures of the federal government reported to the IEA.
14












































































measured in MW/h to proxy the change in size of the market (S)
Figure 5 shows the increase of installed capacity of renewable energies under
the SEG and EEG. It can be seen that until 1999, WATER was the most impor-
tant renewable energy source. After 1999, the share of WIND increased with
high growth rates and its installed capacity exceeded the one of WATER. Until
2005 the installed capacity of SOLAR was still on a lower level than for BIO.
The installed capacity of GEO is almost zero. Figure 6 represents correspond-
ing growth rates to the installed capacity.
Consumer price index electricity (CPIE), a marked based indicator for the
incentives to innovate
Figure 7 gives insights about electricity prices which decreased until the year
2000 and increased again after the year 2000.19
19Having the liberalization of the market for electricity in mind, the decrease in electricity
prices may report the welfare gains due to liberalization. It might be the case that regulation
related to the EEG had some impact on this development.
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ity (CPIE)
3.2 Econometric Model









For our dataset we assume that T ! ¥ and our independent variable con-
sists of a vector with count data. Two major problems therefore are related to
our data. On the one hand observations over time may not be independent
from each other and on the other hand (as we are dealing with count data)
standard errors may not be normally distributed.
If we estimate a linear model with OLS we can formalize the econometrics
as follows (Wooldridge 2002a, pp. 247):
yit = bTxit + ci + uit, (1)
where i = 1,...,n indexes the technologies listed within the different patent
classes (compare table 11 (page 39)) and t = 1,...,T indicates time. The er-
ror term uit is idiosyncratic and ci allows to control for group speciﬁc hetero-
geneity (ﬁxed effects model). Calculating ﬁrst differences for the observations
17
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2002b, p. 365). Non linear AR(1) estimation methods offer additional oppor-
tunities to handle non stationarity of the error component (Wooldridge 2002b,
p. 350).
As mentioned above, the underlying assumption of the normal distribu-
tion does not seem to be most efﬁcient because of the count data characteristic
of patents. Suggested estimation models for event counts20 are negative bi-
nomial models or Poisson models (Maddala 1983, Cameron and Trivedi 1998,
Wooldridge 2002a). The negative binomial model is based on a Poisson distri-
bution with an unobserved error parameter n, implementing heterogeneity in





PATi,t ! Poisson(j) if
(







The standard deviation for the expected value E(PATi,t) = j is given by
V(PATi,t) = j(1 + s2j). Thus, with s ! 0 the intensity is j and the model
converges towards a Poisson distribution. It can be seen that the negative
binomial model is superior compared to the Poisson model.
One striking feature of the linear model or some standard non linear esti-
mation methods like AR(1) is that one can easily correct for serial correlation.
However, applying such models may cause a bias in our estimates because of
the wrong assumption about the functional form. We propose to solve this
problem by the following estimation strategy: The basic model is estimated
with a ﬁrst differences linear ﬁxed effects model. We than compare this model
with the ﬁxed effects negative binomial regression (where we do not control
20An event count “is the realization of a nonnegative integer-valued random variable”
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998, p. 1).
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show comparable results, we can conclude that ﬁrst order serial correlation is
not inﬂating the signiﬁcance of our estimates. Endogenous effects are addi-
tionally controlled for by the use of time dummies. The robustness of our re-
sults is further demonstrated by estimating the AR(1) model (combined with
ﬁrst differences).
In table 2, 4 and 5 we start the estimation with only a few variables and pro-
ceed by integrating additional variables in further steps. In the last column of
table 2, 3, 4 and 5 we report the estimation result for the negative binomial re-
gression. In table 3 and 6 we report estimation results from different additional
models. We try to test hypothesis 1 with the variable DINCAP, hypothesis 2
with CPIE and hypothesis 3 with RuD. We use period dummies to test for the
structural break (hypothesis 4). Model speciﬁcations for the standard model
are given for
PATi(t 1) = gt + b1zi(t 2) + b3(DINCAPit)
+(RuDi(t 1)) + b4(CPIEi(t 2)) + ci + uit, (2)
and for hypothesis 4 we have
PATi(t 1) = b0 + b1zi(t 2) + b
SEG
2 (DINCAPit) + b
EEG
3 (DINCAPit)
+b4(RuDi(t 1))b5(CPIEi(t 2)) + ci + uit. (3)
In the model, t indexes time and i indexes different industries operating
within the GT sector,21 SEG stands for the period from 1990-1999 and EEG rep-
resents the period from 2000-2005. If the variables are indicated with (t   1),
a one year time lag is used in order to incorporate dynamic effects into the
model, (t   2) and (t   3) are two year and three year time lags. D is used
as a symbol for ﬁrst differences. zi(t 2) describes two observable character-
istics integrated as control variables, namely ELCt 2 and APATt 2. ELCt 2
is integrated into the model because electricity prices may also react to elec-
tricity consumption. APATt 2 allows to control for endogenous institutional
21Table 9 (page 38) shows the correlation matrix for the variables integrated into the model.
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Theerrorcomponent ci isgroupspeciﬁc(individualheterogeneity)whereas uit
represents the idiosyncratic error term (dependent on i and t). With respect to
the lag structures, strong assumptions are implemented into the econometric
model. However, the time lags assumed are oriented on earlier contributions
from the literature (Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003, Griliches 1990b, 1998, Hall
et al. 1986). It can be criticized that private R&D expenditures are not inte-
grated as explanatory variable into the econometric model. As we do not have
information on private R&D, we have to stick to the model presented above.
From a theoretical point of view it has to be taken into account that ﬁrms op-
erating within an industry compete with each other. There is the implicit as-
sumption that ﬁrms have to innovate (with process or product innovations) to
be able to compete on the market. Hence, INCAP should also capture at least
parts of successful private R&D.23
With respect to the construction of the panel we got some inspiration from
Johnstone et al. (2008). They run a panel on the international level combining
patent counts with data from the IEA.24 Johnstone et al. (2008) run the regres-
sion with a negative binomial model. As we compare the estimation results
from the ﬁrst differences linear ﬁxed effects model with the estimation results
from the negative Binomial regression we are able to control for ﬁrst order
serial correlation.
3.3 Estimation Results
The results of the Hausman test show that random effects would also be an ap-
propriate estimation method. Nevertheless, we stick to the ﬁxed effects model
as ﬁxed effects is more robust and with the assumption of normally distributed
standard errors it is difﬁcult to interprete the coefﬁcients anyway. In order
22It might be possible that overall patents have increased (e. g. due to institutional changes)
and therefore most of the variance in patenting activity would follow a trend which is observ-
able in overall patent counts.
23However, as can be seen from the estimation results of our OLS regression, less than ﬁfty
percent of the variance are captured by our model. Having information on private R&D may
further increase the explanatory power of our model.
24There are additional important differences. DINCAP was not part of the sample and WA-
TER was not integrated. We run the regression excluding WASTE due to the fact that this
variable does not contribute much to sustainable electricity supply. For more details have a
look at table 11 (page 39).
20
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 002to control for serial correlation we use the Baltagi-Wu LBI-Test (which has to
be estimated with random effects). The test statistic is published in table 3,
column 4. The Baltagi-Wu test statistic is bigger than two (Baltagi-Wu LBI =
2.113425) indicating that there is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation for the AR(1)
model. Because the signiﬁcance of our estimates does only change slightly if
we switch among the AR(1) model, the ﬁrst differences OLS model and the
negative binomial model, we are able to state that ﬁrst order autocorrelation is
not the major problem within our data.
It can also be seen that the main variables of interest do not change signif-
icantly if we compare the linear ﬁrst differences ﬁxed effects model with the
negative binomial regression. Only our control APAT changes its sign and gets
signiﬁcant in most of the cases. Our control ELC becomes insigniﬁcant under
the negative binomial regression reported in table 3. The estimation results
give support for hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. Increase in mar-
ket size positively affects the probability that ﬁrms operating within different
GT industries are engaged in innovative activities. According to hypothesis 2
we come to the result that electricity prices only play a minor role for innova-
tive activity in the different GT industries. The estimation outcomes reported
in table 4 column 3 and 4 indicate that prices may have an impact within a two
year time lag. However, the result vanishes if we include our controls. Inte-
grating the controls is important as leaving them out may generate an omitted
variable bias. The signiﬁcant result for RuD indicates the positive impact pol-
icy induced supply push can have on innovative activity. One may criticize
that in the model with CPIEi(t 3) (compare table 4) there is obviously a prob-
lem of multicollinearity (compare table 10 (p. 39)). CPIE is highly correlated
with ELC and APAT. This problem is not that severe if one keeps in mind that
multicollinearity does not cause a bias in the estimated slope coefﬁcients (as
long as the correlation is not perfect) and OLS remains BLUE (Berry 1993).
The strong evidence for the negative and signiﬁcant result of the coefﬁcient
related to ELCt 2 (compare table 2, table 3 and table 5) is not very intuitive but
is in line with the ﬁndings of Johnstone et al. (2008). One possible explanation
for the negative sign is that investment in GTs was accompanied by policy
measures for energy efﬁciency (Johnstone et al. 2008, p. 14) and therefore elec-
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Table 2: PAT: Estimation result 1a (First Differences Model (FD) and
negative Binomial regression (neg. Bin))
estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS neg.Bin.
method FD FD FD FD
(ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects)
PATt 1
DINCAP 0.031518       0.0302018 0.0001959
(0.0088205) (0.0083791) (0.0000445)
RuDt 2    1.039079    1.018854 0.0061104
(0.3292184) (0.314086) (0.0024728)
CPIEt 2        0.4966235  0.4149241  0.0062943
(0.3961358) (0.3640293) (0.0055762)
ELCt 2           0.0380029  0.0004479
(0.0165895) (0.000168)
APATt 2           0.0008328 0.000021+
(0.0011242) (0.0000114)
b0 1.936991 4.100494 1.583963 3.154136 6.642954
time dummies No No No No No
R-sq 0.1844 0.1044 0.0249 0.3501
Wald chi2(5) 133.82
Nr. of Observations: 70 70 65 65 70
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5
Signiﬁcance:   1%,  5%,+  10%
The structural break (hypothesis 4) is tested by the use of period dummies
for INCAP (compare table 5). The Chow-test was calculated for the regression
reported in the fourth and ﬁfth column. The test statistic did not show any
signiﬁcant difference between the two coefﬁcients.25 We thus have to reject
hypothesis 4. One possible explanation might be given by ﬁgure 2 (page 12).
Due to the fact that most GT industries (except WIND) are still operating on
rather low scales (compare ﬁgure 5), one can argue that GTs on average are
still in the take-off phase. This may explain the relatively low difference in the
slope coefﬁcient. Having the theory of industrial dynamics in mind, it is plau-
sible to assume that coming to the acceleration phase the linear relationship
will disappear.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: We ﬁnd good evidence
for hypothesis 1, there is support for hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. Hypoth-
25Under OLS the p-value for the Chow-test (HA signiﬁcant difference in coefﬁcients) was re-
ported to be 35.16 percent. If the Chow-test was calculated for the negative binomial regression
the p-value increased to 73.25 percent. In 35.16 (73.25) percent of the cases we cannot reject HO
indicating that there is not signiﬁcant difference in the coefﬁcients.
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time dummies included
estimation OLS GLS AR(1) AR(1) neg.Bin.
method FD FD FD FD
(ﬁxed effects) (random effects) (ﬁxed effects) (random effects) (ﬁxed effects)
PATt 1
DINCAP 0.0291369 0.03143 0.0291153 0.0318369 0.0001903
(0.0090864) (0.0087421) (0.0093004) (0.3595341) (0.000044)
RuDt 1 1.211616 1.056867 1.309931 1.098368 0.0065433
(0.3825941) (0.3599975) (0.386108) (0.3595341) (0.0026027)
CPIEt 2  0.5227731  0.5053394  0.5248703  0.5035705  0.0082038
(0.4096686) (0.4051253) (0.4079489) (0.4023662) (0.0068756)
ELCt 2  0.073431  0.0687862  0.0761015  0.0698056  0.0002328
(0.0267883) (0.0263069) (0.0269798) (0.026377) (0.0002038)
APATt 2  0.0026993  0.0025231  0.0027616  0.002535 0.0000184
(0.0017919) (0.0017695) (0.0017907) (0.0017628) (0.0000181)
b0 7.848957 6.789275 8.434545 7.006506 5.735006
time dummies YES YES YES YES YES
R-sq 0.4144 0.4174 0.4173 0.4433
Wald chi2 36.47 150.68
Baltagi-Wu LBI 2.113425
Nr. of observations: 65 65 60 65 70
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5
Signiﬁcance:   1%,  5%,+  10%
Table 4: PAT: Estimation result 1c, model with two years time differ-
ence between PAT and CPIE
estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS neg.Bin.
method FD FD FD FD FD
(ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects) (ﬁxed effects)
PATt 1
DINCAP    0.0310202    0.0300739 0.0299035 0.0002053
(0.009274) (0.0084534) (0.0085125) (0.0000473)
RuDt 1       1.157342 1.119732 1.170648 0.0069161
(0.3589887) (0.3251934) (0.3298149) (0.0029355)
CPIEt 3 0.6090625 0.4691462 0.8728286+ 0.7286088+ 0.8491981 0.001469
(0.4737662) (0.4365525) (0.4448474) (0.4047913) (0.5653796) (0.0070755)
ELCt 3              0.0101108  0.0002682
(0.0204088) (0.0002671)
APATt 2             0.0011585 0.0000314
(0.0013187) (0.0000145)
b0 5.157509+ 3.075181 7.302342 5.213833 4.04667 3.932665
time dummies No No No No No No
R-sq 0.0281 0.2198 0.1596 0.3473 0.3632
Wald chi2(5) 97.24
Nr. of Observations: 60 60 60 60 60 65
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5 5
Signiﬁcance:   1%,  5%,+  10%
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estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS neg.Bin.
method FD FD FD FD




0.032095 0.0320388 0.031452 0.0307259 0.0001859
(0.008878) (0.0082015) (0.0091931) (0.0084065) (0.0000533)
DINCAP
EEG
0.0333466 0.0330009 0.0328012 0.0321356 0.0001943
(0.0091505) (0.0084539) (0.0094563) (0.0086367) (0.0000448)
RuDt 1    1.031156    1.001563 0.0060137
(0.2999175) (0.3149585) (0.0024934)
CPIEt 2        0.3049563  0.4460741  0.0067637
(0.3718595) (0.3659216) (0.0057518)
ELCt 2           0.0395008  0.0004512
(0.0166834) (0.0001686)
APATt 2           0.0009091 0.0000199+
(0.0011284) (0.0000118)
b0 1.850512 2.547872 0.4977128 3.09456 6.768015
time dummies No No No No No
R-sq 0.1931 0.2975 0.2144 0.3618
Wald chi2 133.64
Nr. of Observations: 70 70 65 65 70
Nr. of groups: 5 5 5 5 5
Signiﬁcance:   1%,  5%,+  10%
Table 6: PAT: Reverse causality
estimation OLS GLS AR(1)
method FD FD FD
(ﬁxed effects) (random effects) (ﬁxed effects)
DINCAP
PATt 1 6.326775 6.592951 5.69906
(1.755278) (1.652705) (1.641692)
CPIEt 1  3.844091  3.647414  3.876413
(5.305394) (5.179065) (5.375029)
RuDt 1  6.793616  6.801143  7.104368
(4.876487) (4.526577) (4.440642)
ELCt 1 0.161962 0.1715023 0.0317271
(0.250351) (0.2436037) (0.2552254)
APATt 1  0.0030656  0.0027472  0.0015684
(0.0163475) (0.0159701) (0.0145496)
b0 15.43433 14.53108 21.80976
time dummies No No No
R-sq 0.2384 0.2385 0.2444
Number of observations: 65 65 60
Number of groups: 5 5 5
Signiﬁcance:   1%,  5%,+  10%
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in the direction that demand is one important factor that ﬁrms operating in
different GT industries are engaged in innovative activities. As reported in ta-
ble 6, reverse causality issues also play an important role. This has to be taken
into account by interpreting the result for hypothesis 1. There is clear evidence
that innovations in GTs increase the size of the marked endogenously. This
is in line with the literature. Even though the model is quite robust under un-
changed time lags, it has to be mentioned that a change in the model dynamics
alsochangessomeoftheestimationresults. Therefore, wetriedtomotivatethe
assumed time lags theoretically.
In the following section we try to assess the observed structural change in
the German energy system. We distinguish among two major arguments that
are used in order to justify investments in GTs. One argument is based on the
externality problem and the other argument is based on non-sustainability in
the energy system.
4 Environmental Impact of Structural Change in the En-
ergy System and the Schmookler Hypothesis
Recent energy production in Germany is still highly dependent on conven-
tionalenergytechnologies. Theyhavethemajorcharacteristicthatnon-renewable/
exhaustible energy sources26 they use as an input. The system hence lacks long-
term sustainability. Non-renewable energy sources have the shortcoming that
they are either responsible for externalities in form of CO2 emissions27 (like
in the case of COAL or GAS) or that there are unsolved externality problems
(like in the case of NUCLEAR energy). In comparison to this renewable ener-
gies have the major advantage that they are able to produce energy without
imposing remarkable harm to the environment. However, energy production
with non-renewable energy sources is more cost intensive and substitution of
26A deﬁnition for exhaustibility is given by Dasgupta and Heal (1979), p. 153:“an exhaustible
resource is [...] used up when used as an input in production and at the same time its undis-
turbed rate of growth is nil”.
27CO2 emissions represent one big part of total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which are
seen to be highly responsible for global warming (IPCC 2007, p. 5).
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Two distinct problems are often combined when the discussion is about
structural change in the energy system and diffusion of GTs. The ﬁrst problem
is related to externalities and the second to transition from a non-renewable
energy system to a system mainly based on renewable energies in order to
implement long-term sustainability.
If the discussion is about the externality problem one can argue that a sub-
stitution of conventional energy technologies by GTs has to reduce externali-
ties and consequently its diffusion contributes positively to the environment.
Another option would be to apply instruments that allow to enforce the in-
ternalization of the externality directly by the non-renewable energy technolo-
gies. Theoretically such an approach has some advantages as GTs cannot be
treated to be adequate substitutes to conventional energy technologies so far.
Economic theory offers different instruments that can be applied to the
environmental externality problem. Some instruments worth mentioned are
quotas (Baumol et al. 1988, pp. 57), taxes (Pigou 1924), property rights (Coase
1960), negative rules (Hayek 1978/1993), tradable certiﬁcates (Dales 1968) and
trial and error processes implemented via regulation (Baumol and Oates 1971).
In the case of CO2 emissions and the related problem of global warming, trad-
able certiﬁcates have many desirable features and are highly recommended
(Olmstead and Stavins 2006). Diffusion of GTs according to this reasoning can-
not be treated to be a ﬁrst best solution. If diffusion of GTs is combined with
tradable certiﬁcates (like in the case of Germany), the positive environmental
impacts vanish (Traber and Kemfert 2009).
Apart from the externality problem there is an additional argument why
diffusion of GTs may have positive impacts. This argument is related to the
problem of non-sustainability in the energy system. Sustainability requires
transition from non-renewable energy sources to a system that mainly builds
on GTs (“backstop technologies”). The point in time of transition can be in-
ﬂuenced by policymakers (“transition management”). The European Union
for instance has implemented a directive that in 2020 the percentage of to-
tal energy that shall be produced with renewable energies has to be at least
20 percent (COM 2008). The aim of sustainable energy supply is also used as
26
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 002an argument for diffusion of GTs under the EEG.28
The lack of sustainability is one major concern in many studies that cope
with environmental problems (Kemp 1997, Norgaard 1994, van den Bergh and
Gowdy 2000, van den Bergh 2003, van den Bergh et al. 2007, Nill and Kemp
2009). If non-sustainability is treated to be a major problem in the energy sec-
tor, than successful transition management towards sustainability needs reg-
ulation, unlocking policy to preserve diversity and fostering of innovations
(van den Bergh et al. 2007).
Even though the argument of sustainability seems to be convincing at ﬁrst
glance, thereareconcernstoapplysustainabilityastheadequatenormativear-
gument for transition management in the energy sector. One important aspect
comes from environmental and resource economics. There is the argument
that extraction of a non-renewable energy source is a decision among expected
proﬁts to be earned in the future by leaving the resource in the ground and
proﬁts that can be earned by extraction of the resource. One of the shortcom-
mings is that from an international perspective investments into GTs may not
lead to an increase in sustainability (Sinn 2008). This counterintuitive result
can be explained by the “Hotelling” model (Hotelling 1931) about extraction
of non-renewable energy sources (compare also Gray (1914)). An equilibrium
requires that pA1 = pA0(1 + r) where pA0 is the competitive market price for
the exhaustible resource today, pA1 the competitive market price for the fol-
lowing period and r is the real interest rate (Wacker and Blank 1999, p. 16).
Figure 8 and ﬁgure 9 are aimed to visualize the impact GTs may have on the
speed of extraction for non-renewable energy sources.
In ﬁgure 8 and 9 cB stands for the marginal production costs of renew-
able energy technologies modeled as “backstop technologies” (Nordhaus et al.
1973), t indicates time and pA represents the world market price for a non-
renewable energy source (e. g. COAL). It can be seen (compare ﬁgure 8) that
there has to be a switch to energy produced with backstop technologies once
28Article 1(1) EEG: “facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the
sake of protecting our climate and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy supply to
the national economy, also by incorporating external long-term effects, to conserve fossil fuels
and to promote the further development of technologies for the generation of electricity from
renewable energy sources” (EEG 2009).
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Own presentation, oriented on Wacker and Blank (1999), p. 43.
Figure 9: Transition from A to B with managed transition (open
economy perspective)





Own presentation, oriented on Wacker and Blank (1999), p. 43.
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tain GT j (compare also Wacker and Blank (1999), pp. 43). In ﬁgure 9, the
values indicated with an apostrophe represent the change in relative prices
due to a managed transition to GTs. It can be seen that the change in relative
prices has an impact on the speed of extraction with the possible result that
investment into GTs does not conserve non-renewable energy sources rather
than to increase their consumption.
The underlying relationship can be explained as follows: The decrease in
expected revenues related to the extraction of non-renewable energy sources
(because of the possible substitution through backstop technologies) leads to
the result that resource owners increase the rate of extraction. The backstop
technologies change the equilibrium condition from pA1 = pA0(1+r) to p0
A1 =
p0
A0(1 + r) with p0
A1, p0
A0 < pA1, pA0. The decrease in world market prices will
be accompanied by an increase in current consumption of non-renewable en-
ergy sources (compare also Baumol et al. (1988), pp. 138). This model builds
on the assumption that renewable energies are adequate substitutes to conven-
tional energy technologies. So far this does not seem to be the case for most
GTs available. However, if innovations indicate growth and the possibility to
substitute conventional energy technologies in the near future, price reactions
become more likely. The investment into backstop-technologies thus may ac-
celerate consumption of non-renewable energy sources.
It can be seen that theoretically there is a lack of straightforward arguments
for a managed transition towards an energy system that mainly builds on re-
newable energies. It therefore seems to be a better strategy to focus on in-
ternalization of the externality and to adapt the institutional setting in order
to allow for an endogenous transition from non-renewable energy sources to-
wards sustainability in the energy system. If there would be complete internal-
ization of the externality, the increase in production costs for conventional en-
ergy technologies may have the side effect that some GTs become competitive.
Following this line of arguments, transition from a niche to a new economic
system has to evolve endogenously once a change in relative prices makes in-
vestments into transition technologies proﬁtable (Nordhaus et al. 1973). This
was also the argument that has become known as the “Schmookler hypothe-
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the dissemination of a sufﬁciently superior technology is possible under these
special circumstances (Witt 1997). Nevertheless, there remains an important
role for energy related public R&D (Popp and Newell 2009) in order to foster
energy related innovations and/or inventions to overcome the double exter-
nality problem (Rennings 2000).
Two policy-reforms thus can be considered to be in line with the require-
ments for an efﬁcient transition towards change in the energy system. The
SEG as necessary requirement for a market access of GTs (compare also sec-
tion 2) and the liberalization of the energy market at the end of the 1990’s as
a necessary requirement for an increase in competition at the energy market.
The SEG already allowed for a ﬁrst diffusion of some GTs j (Wangler 2009).
The problem that occurs is that non-renewable energy sources still produce
externalities leading to distortions in competition. However, as mentioned
above, a ﬁrst best solution would be the internalization of the externality. This
aim could be achieved by a stricter application of the emission trading scheme
combined with open market access for GTs.
That supply is able to react in a very short time period to a changes in
relative prices (the same is true for innovations), is one of the results demon-
strated by the econometric model. However, as diffusion of GTs has been im-
plemented artiﬁcially, diffusion of GTs may increase the speed of extraction of
non-renewable energy sources. Diffusion of GTs therefore is accompanied by
inefﬁciencies without signiﬁcant positive impact on the environment. What
remains is the positive effect of a reduction in uncertainty and the increase in
knowledge stocks related to the production of green technologies.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study was aimed to test if policy induced structural change in the en-
ergy sector in Germany is accompanied by innovative activity. The empirical
ﬁndings support the hypothesis that an increase in the size of the market has
an impact on ﬁrms to be innovative. The empirical ﬁndings also show that
public R&D expenditures are important. We test for reverse causality and ﬁnd
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shares by themselves. Innovations in GTs are a necessary condition to sub-
stitute conventional energy technologies in the future. However, investment
into GTs may not help to preserve non-renewable energy sources. There is also
little hope for positive environmental impacts as feed-in tariffs are applied si-
multaneously with tradable certiﬁcates. Additional concerns are related to the
institutional setting of the EEG as it bears the potential threat to create new
lock-ins. Efﬁciency related to the diffusion of GTs would require a mechanism
that allows for more self-selection by the market about future potential of dif-
ferent GTs j.
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The empirical data
Patents (PAT) and all patents Germany (APAT), source DEPATIS net
Table 11 contains the list of patent classes from which the patent counts are
extracted. The “renewable energy sector speciﬁc technologies” of interest are
electricity production with wind (WIND), solar (SOLAR), water & ocean (WA-
TER),geothermal(GEO)andbiomass(BIO).Theoriginaltableonpatentclasses
has been developed by Johnstone et al. (2008).29 The patent data comes from
the German Patent ofﬁce.30 The vector contains patents that have been granted
in Germany (including the “Neue Bundesländer”) using the date of applica-
tion.31 The data does not contain double counting and only those patents with
priority for Germany are taking into account in order to exclude foreign inven-
tors. Information captured with PAT are on national level and sector speciﬁc
(WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO, BIO).
Information captured with APAT are also on national level but are not sector
speciﬁc. APAT stands for the count of alls patents applied for in Germany.
German R&D expenditures(RuD), source IEA
The data on sector speciﬁc public expenditures on R&D in the different GT in-
dustries comes from the international energy agency.32 R&D refers to expen-
ditures of the federal government. The resources can be given to private as
well as public entities. The data is in million Euro on exchange rates from
2006.33 Information captured with RuD are on national level and sector spe-
ciﬁc (WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO, BIO).
German installed capacity of sector speciﬁc technology INCAP,
source BUND
INCAP is used as a proxy for the size of the market for different GTs. The
data contains information about the installed capacity measured in megawatt
hours (MWh). It measures the overall installed capacity of the sector speciﬁc
technology per year. The data comes from the Ministry for the Environment
in Germany.34 Information captured with INCAP are on national level and
sector speciﬁc (WIND, SOLAR, WATER, GEO, BIO)).
29NotethatthelistisextendedwithpatentclassesforWATERasthelawforrenewableenergy
which is analyzed for Germany also changed the institutional framework for energy produced
with water. On the other hand WASTE is excluded from the list because it is difﬁcult to separate
non-renewable waste from renewable waste.
30For further information see http://depatisnet.dpma.de/DepatisNet/depatisnet?-
window=1&space=menu&content=index&action=recherche&session=c23b66f230d535e054a-
0e96346f598d6b4b3c0c1ada0&stamp=34353.
31Even though information about patents until 2007 are available, the analysis is restricted to
2005. The information about the last two years is dropped to get rid of the problem that there
is a long time lag between the application for a patent and patent granting. Once the patent
is granted, the patent protection goes back to the application date. Therefore, it is plausible to
assume that the data from 2006 and 2007 contains a lack of information (Popp 2005, p. 5).
32For further information see http://www.iea.org/.
33The data for Germany on the national level does not contain information about the expen-
ditures of regional governments.
34Compare BMU (2007).
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and IEA
The electricity price index comes from the German Statistical Ofﬁce. CPIE
is inﬂation corrected and the year 2004 is set to 100. Consumption taxes are
not taken into account. Information about ELC comes from the International
Energy Agency. ELC is measured in kilowatt hours per capita. Information
captured with CPIE and ELC are on the national level and are not sector spe-
ciﬁc.
Table 7: Correlation matrix 1
PAT INCAP CPIE ELC APAT RuD
PAT 1.0000
INCAP 0.1745 1.0000
CPIE -0.2146 -0.2630 1.0000
ELC 0.1380 0.3558 -0.5783 1.0000
APAT 0.2214 0.2927 -0.9467 0.5699 1.0000
RuD 0.7675 -0.2187 0.1156 -0.0693 -0.1271 1.0000
Table 8: Correlation matrix 2
PATt 1 INCAP CPIEt 2 ELCt 2 APATt 2 RuDt 1
PATt 1 1.0000
INCAP 0.4076 1.0000
CPIEt 2 -0.1822 -0.3500 1.0000
ELCt 2 0.0755 0.2465 -0.6393 1.0000
APATt 2 0.1873 0.3401 -0.9555 0.5095 1.0000
RuDt 1 0.7854 0.0180 0.1230 -0.0429 -0.1434 1.0000
Table 9: Correlation matrix 3
DPAT D(DINCAP) DCPIEt 2 DELCt 2 DAPATt 2 DRuDt 1
DPATt 1 1.0000
D(DINCAP) 0.4434 1.0000
DCPIEt 2 -0.1578 -0.1618 1.0000
DELCt 2 -0.1726 0.0016 -0.1941 1.0000
DAPATt 2 -0.0140 -0.0202 -0.2537 -0.1957 1.0000
DRuDt 1 0.3028 -0.0121 -0.0913 0.1176 -0.0155 1.0000
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DPAT D(DINCAP) DCPIEt 3 DELCt 3 DAPATt 2 DRuDt 1
DPATt 1 1.0000
D(DINCAP) 0.4517 1.0000
DCPIEt 3 0.1676 0.0931 1.0000
DELCt 3 -0.1230 -0.0198 -0.4736 1.0000
DAPATt 2 -0.0133 -0.0208 -0.5101 0.0009 1.0000
DRuDt 1 0.3274 -0.0095 -0.1775 0.1464 -0.0110 1.0000
Table 11: IPC codes for Renewable Energy Technologies
WIND Class Sub-Classes
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially in wind direction F03D 1/00-06
Wind motors with rotation axis substantially at right angle to wind direction F03D 3/00-06
Other wind motors F03D 5/00-06
Controlling wind motors F03D 7/00-06
Adaptations of wind motors for special use F03D 9/00-02
Details, component parts, or accessories not provided for in,
or of interest apart from, the other groups of this subclass F03D 11/00-04
Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60L 8/00
Effecting propulsion by wind motors driving water-engaging propulsive elements B63H 13/00
SOLAR
Devices for producing mechanical power from solar energy F03G 6/00-08
Use of solar heat, e.g. solar heat collectors F24J 2/00-54
Machine plant or systems using particular sources of energy - sun F25B 27/00B
Drying solid materials or objects by processes involving the application
of heat by radiation - e.g. sun F26B 3/28
Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation - including a panel or
array of photoelectric cells, e.g. solar cells H01L 31/042
Generators in which light radiation is directly converted into electrical energy H02N 6/00
Aspects of rooﬁng for the collection of energy - i.e. solar panels E04D 13/18
Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, wind B60L 8/00
WATER/OCEAN
Engines of impulse type, i.e. turbines with jets of high-velocity liquid impinging
on bladed or like rotors, e.g. Pelton wheels F03B 1/00-04
Machines or engines of reaction type; Parts or details peculiar thereto F03B 3/00-18
Water wheels F03B 7/00
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use; combinations of machines
or engines with driving or driven apparatus F03B 13/00-10
Controlling F03B 15/00-22
Adaptations of machines or engines for special use - characterized by using
wave or tide energy F03B 13/12-24
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms - ocean thermal energy conversion F03G 7/05
Mechanical-power producing mechanisms - using pressure differentials or
thermal differences F03G 7/04
Water wheels F03B 7/00
GEOTHERMAL
Other production or use of heat, not derived from combustion - using
natural or geothermal heat F24J 3/00-08
Devices for producing mechanical power from geothermal energy F03G 4/00-06
Electric motors using thermal effects H02N 10/00
BIOMASS
Solid fuels based on materials of non-mineral origin - animal or vegetable C10L 5/42-44
Engines operating on gaseous fuels from solid fuel - e.g. wood F02B 43/08
Liquid carbonaceous fuels - organic compounds C10L 1/14
Anion exchange - use of materials, cellulose or wood B01J 41/16
 From the original table WASTE has been excluded and WATER has been added.
Own presentation, oriented on Johnstone et al. (2008)
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Table 12: Remuneration (FIT) for different GTs
Technology j Remuneration (2000-2003) Annual
(ct/KWh) Reduction (d)
Wind (WIND) 9.1 1.4%
Solar (SOLAR)
Capacity< 100KW 51.62 5.0%
Plants on building capacity < 5 MW 48,1 5.0%
Biomass (BIO)
Capacity< 500KW 10.0 1.0%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 9.0 1.0%
Capacity> 5MW< 20MW 8.5 1.0%
Hydro (WATER)
Capacity< 500KW 7.67 0%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 6.5 0%
Landﬁll and sewage gas (BIOGAS)
Capacity< 500KW 7.67 1.5%
Capacity> 500KW< 5MW 6.5 1.5%
Geothermal plants (GEO)
Capacity< 20MW 8.5 0%
Capacity> 20MW 7.0 0%
40
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 002